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OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
ROSENN, Circuit Judge.
The petitioner-appellant, Sandra
Barker, appeals from a final order by the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”)
denying her motion to reopen her
deportation proceedings.  The Board
denied Barker’s motion to reopen its
decision, dismissing her appeal from an
immigration court’s order of deportation,
because of her failure to depart voluntarily
from this country as ordered.  We affirm.
I.
Barker, a native and citizen of
Jamaica, entered the United States on
January 1, 1989, with a fiancée visa, with
permission to remain in this country until
April 14, 1989.  She did not marry her
fiancé and remained in the United States
longer than permitted.  On June 26, 1996,
the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), the predecessor to the
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services, com men ced d epor tation
proceedings against her with the filing of
an Order to Show Cause why she should
not be deported.  
Barker appeared before an
immigration judge (IJ) in September 1996.
She admitted the allegations contained in
the Order to Show Cause.  Based on the
admissions, the IJ found her deportable as
charged.  She requested relief and
protection from deportation in the form of
political asylum, withholding of
deportation, and suspension of deportation.
In the alternative, she sought the privilege
of voluntary departure.
Barker offered testimony and
documentary evidence in support of her
applications for relief and protection from
deportation.  She sought asylum and
withholding of deportation based on her
2claim of having been persecuted, and
having a fear of persecution, in Jamaica on
account of her political opinion and her
family’s alleged involvement with the
Jamaica National Party.  She sought
suspension of deportation based on a claim
of extreme hardship if deported from the
United States.
Upon a hearing, the IJ denied
Barker’s application for asylum in all of its
aspects. The IJ, however, granted Barker’s
alternative request for voluntary departure
until October 4, 1997.  In granting
voluntary departure, the immigration judge
informed Barker orally:
I have granted you voluntary
departure for a period of six
months.  If you do not appeal your
case, or if you appeal your case
and lose, then you will have to
leave the United States.  Okay.  It
may be possible to get more time
beyond October 4th, but you
would have to ask the Immigration
Service for that not me, I have no
authority to extend that time. . . .
If you remain beyond the departure
date without a very good excuse,
for example, if you get seriously
sick or injured, then there will be
penalties, you’ll be ordered
deported back to Jamaica and
you’ll also lose the right to apply
for certain kinds of important
immigration benefits for a period
of five years.  I’m giving you
forms in English and in Spanish,
that describes those penalties and
I’m also giving you a copy of the
order that I’m entering today
d e n y in g  t h e  a s yl u m  a n d
withholding, and suspension and
granting you voluntary departure
for six months.  Ms. Barker, do
you have any questions?
As noted by the IJ, he provided
Barker with written notice of the
limitations on discretionary relief if she
failed to depart voluntarily by October 4,
1997. 
Written notice was provided to
Barker in English and Spanish and that
“[o]ral notice of the contents of this notice
was given to the alien in his/her native
language, or in a language he/she
understands.”
Barker appealed the IJ’s decision to
the Board.  The Board dismissed the
appeal on October 29, 2001.  The Board’s
dismissal decision, however, “permitted
[Barker] to depart from the United States
voluntarily within 30 days from the [date
of the Board’s decision] or any extension
beyond that time as may be granted by the
district director; and in the event of failure
so to depart, [Barker] shall be deported as
provided in the Immigration Judge’s
order.”1  
Barker did not depart but filed a
motion to reopen her deportation
proceedings with the Board.  The motion
requested reconsideration of her eligibility
for suspension of deportation in light of
new evidence unavailable at the time of
the IJ’s decision.  Barker acknowledged in
the motion that her “previous period of
voluntary departure has expired.”  The
motion, therefore, alternatively requested
that “the Board extend her voluntary
departure until a day 30 days following
adjudication of the instant Motion,
including any judicial review thereof.”
Barker subsequently supplemented her
motion, indicating that she would be
seeking to adjust her immigration statute
based on her recent marriage to a United
States citizen.  The motion, as
supplemented, did not indicate that she had
1 Barker never sought a judicial review
of the Board’s dismissal decision.
3not received oral and written notice of the
consequences for failing to voluntarily
depart.  Nor did she explain why she
remained in the United States beyond her
voluntary departure period.
The Board denied Barker’s motion
to reopen on two grounds.  First, the Board
concluded that the motion was filed
untimely.  Second, the Board concluded
that Barker was statutorily barred, under §
240B(d) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d), from
applying for certain forms of discretionary
relief, absent a showing of exceptional
circumstances for failing to depart
voluntarily.  Specifically, the Board noted,
contrary to Barker’s assertion, that she
may otherwise qualify for an adjustment of
status “[was] not sufficient to establish
exceptional circumstances,” “such as
serious illness of the alien or death of an
immediate relative of the alien, but not
including less compelling circumstances
beyond the control of the alien.”  (Brackets
omitted.)  The Board noted that Barker had
received both oral and written notice of the
consequences of failure to depart
voluntarily and she had failed to depart
voluntarily as ordered.  The Board
therefore concluded that Barker was
statutorily barred from applying for
suspension of deportation and adjustment
of status.  This appeal followed.
II.
This Court has appellate
jurisdiction to review the Board’s denial of
a motion to reopen.  Sevoian v. Ashcroft,
290 F.3d 166, 169 (3d Cir. 2002).  This
Court reviews the Board’s denial of a
motion to reopen on grounds of failure to
make out a prima facie case for abuse of
discretion, and the Board’s findings of fact
for substantial evidence.  Id. at 173.  Under
the abuse of discretionary standard, the
Board’s decision is reversible only if it is
“arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”
Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir.
1994).  In reviewing the Board’s findings
of fact under the substantial evidence
standard, this Court’s scope of review is
narrow.  Sevoian, at 171.  An alien seeking
judicial reversal of findings of facts by the
Board must show that the evidence was
“so compelling that the no reasonable
factfinder could fail to find” in her favor.
Elias-Zacarias v. INS, 502 U.S. 478, 483-
84 (1992).
The Supreme Court has identified
three independent grounds for the denial of
a motion to  reopen immigration
proceedings: (1) the movant’s failure to
establish a prima facie case for the relief
sought; (2) the movant’s failure to
introduce previously available, material
evidence that justifies reopening; or (3) a
determination that even if the above two
requirements were met, the movant would
not be entitled to the discretionary grant of
relief sought.  INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94,
105 (1988); Sevoian, at 169-70.  “Motions
for reopening of immigration proceedings
are disfavored. . . .  This is especially true
in a deportation proceeding, where, as a
general matter, every delay works to the
disadvantage of the deportable alien who
wishes merely to remain in the United
States.”  INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314,
323 (1992).
A.
On appeal, Barker argues first that
the Board erred in denying her motion to
reopen because the IJ failed to provide her
with proper notice of the consequences for
failing to depart voluntarily.2  Specifically,
2 Barker also argues on appeal that her
motion to reopen was timely filed.  The
respondent-appellee, John D. Ashcroft,
Attorney General of the United States,
agrees with her argument in this regard,
conceding that the Board erred in
concluding that Barker’s motion to
4she argues that the IJ failed to provide the
requisite oral notice to her of each of the
consequences of failing to depart
voluntarily, specifically the consequences
of losing the benefits of suspension of
deportation or adjustment of status.3  She
argues that the IJ’s general warning that
she would “lose the right to apply for
certain kinds of important immigration
benefits for a period of five years” is
insufficient.  In addition, she argues that
the IJ’s oral warning of a failure to depart
voluntarily “without a very good excuse,
for example, if you get seriously sick or
injured” is insufficient explanation of the
statutory requirement of “exceptional
circumstances” because the judge’s words
were “vague.”  Barker argues next that the
Board erred in holding that she was
ineligible for filing a motion to reopen.
B.
Contrary to Barker’s second
argument, the Board never held in its
decision denying her motion to reopen that
she was ineligible for filing a motion to
reopen.  The Board’s decision was based
on her statutory ineligibility to apply for
suspension of deportation or adjustment of
status, absent a showing of “exceptional
circumstances,” for her failure to depart
voluntarily as ordered.  The Board
concluded that she showed no statutorily
defined “exceptional circumstances.”
Barker has not disputed this conclusion on
appeal.  Barker’s extensive second
argument is, therefore, misguided.4
As correctly noted by the appellee,
Barker failed to raise in her previous
motion to reopen that she did not receive
adequate or sufficient oral notice of the
consequences of failing to depart
voluntarily.  Her failure to raise this issue
before the Board bars this Court’s
consideration of this claim now.  Alleyne
v. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 1182 (3d Cir.
1989) (citing Campos-Guardado v. INS,
reopen was untimely filed.   
3 Section 242B(e)(2), 8 U.S.C. §
1252b(e)(2) (1994) provides:
(A)  In General
Subject to subparagraph (B), any alien
allowed to depart voluntarily under
section 1254(e)(1) of this title or who has
agreed to depart voluntarily at his own
expense under section 1252(b)(1) of this
title who remains in the United States
after the scheduled date of departure,
other than because of exceptional
circumstances, shall not be eligible for
relief described in paragraph (5) for a
period of 5 years after the scheduled date
of departure or the date of unlawful
reentry, respectively.
(B) Written and oral notice required
Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to an
alien allowed to depart voluntarily
unless, before such departure, the
Attorney General has provided written
notice to the alien in English and Spanish
and oral notice either in the alien's native
language or in another language the alien
understands of the consequences under
subparagraph (A) of the alien's remaining
in the United States after the scheduled
date of departure, other than because of
exceptional circumstances.
4 Because Barker misinterprets the basis
of the Board’s denial of her motion to
reopen, this Court will not consider
another argument of hers on appeal that
the Board’s construction of §§
242B(e)(2(A) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution, which is based on such
misinterpretation.
5809 F.2d 285, 291 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 826 (1987); Florez-De Solis v.
INS, 796 F.2d 330, 335 (9th Cir. 1986).
This Court will not, therefore, review
Barker’s first argument; it was not raised
before the Board.5
III.
In conclusion, we emphasize that
what bars the reopening of Barker’s
deportation proceedings is her unexcused
failure to comply with the Order of
Voluntary Departure.  It was granted to her
as a privilege in response to her request.
“A grant of voluntary departure allows a
deportable alien to leave the country
without suffering the consequences of a
formal deportation order.  A deported alien
is excludable from the country for five
years, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(17) (1982), and
commits a felony if he or she ever returns
without permission.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(f),
1326 (1982).”  Cunanan v. INS, 856 F.2d
1373, 1374 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988).
Unfortunately, Barker did not avail herself
of the privilege of voluntary departure.
The penalty for her unexcused failure may
appear to be harsh in view of her recent
marriage, but this Court notes that her
failure to depart voluntarily has also
caused INS to “[become] involved in
further and more costly procedures” by
expending additional resources in
removing her that could have been avoided
had she complied with the original order
requested by herself.  See Zazueta-Carrillo
v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166, 1173 (9th Cir.
2003) (quoting Ballenilla-Gonzalez v.
INS, 546 F.2d 515, 521 (2d Cir.1976)).
We do not have the discretionary power to
lift the statutory bar against reopening her
deportation proceedings because of her
failure to abide by the Order of Voluntary
Departure.  See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787, 792 (1977) (immigration legislation is
“subject only to narrow judicial review”);
United States v. Pollard, 326 F.3d 397,
405-406 (3d Cir. 2003).
 Accordingly, the Board’s decision
of denying Barker’s motion to reopen her
deportation proceedings will be affirmed.
Costs taxed against the appellant.
5We note here, however, that Barker’s
first argument has no merit because the
record clearly shows that the IJ provided
both adequate oral and written notice as
statutorily required.
